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CORPORATIONS AND THE ATTORNEY-CLIENT PRIVILEGE:
GARNER v. WOLFINBARGER
Twice in recent years federal court decisions ) have denied de-
fendant corporations the right to invoke the attorney-client privilege.
Severely criticized,' the first of these decisions was reversed' with the
appellate court noting, however, that the availability of the privilege
in the corporate context must be strictly construed.' The second de-
cision, Garner v. Wolfinbarger,' also reversed on appeal, has again
raised the question of limitations on the availability of the attorney-
client privilege to corporations.
In Garner, the stockholder of First American Life Insurance Co.
of Alabama brought a class action against the corporation, alleging
common law fraud and violations of federal and state securities laws,
During the pre-trial deposition stage, the corporation objected to
certain questions posed to the corporation's former attorney concerning
corporate communications made to him. The corporation argued that
the attorney-client privilege barred the plaintiff from obtaining dis-
closure of communications, either oral or written, between the corpo-
rate client and its attorney.' The district court ruled the privilege
unavailable to the corporation as against the plaintiff stockholders,8
holding that the common law did not extend the privilege to corpora-
tions. The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reversed the
decision of the district court and remanded the case because the
lower court had not applied the proper test for resolution of the
privilege issue. The court of appeals held that, in shareholder suits
alleging corporate activity adverse to stockholder interests, the protec-
tion of both stockholder and corporate interests requires that the
availability of the privilege be subject to the right of stockholders to
1 Radiant Burners, Inc. v. American Gas Ass'n, 207 F. Supp. 771 (N.D. III. 1962)
and Garner v. Wolfinbarger, 280 F. Supp. 1018 (N.D. Ala. 1968). For general recognition
of the privilege, see United States v. Louisville & N.R.R., 236 U.S. 318 (1915);
Schwimmer v. United States, 232 F.2d 855 (8th Cir. 1956), cert. denied, 352 U.S. 833
(1956).
2 See Note, 76 Ham L. Rev. 655 (1963); Note, 4 B.C. Ind. & Com. L. Rev. 416
(1963).
a Radiant Burners, Inc. v. American Gas Ass'n, 320 F.2d 314 (7th Cir. 1963).
4 Id. at 323.
6 Garner v. Wolfinbarger, 430 F.2d 1093 (5th Cir. 1970).
6 The stockholders brought suit against the directors, officers and controlling
persons, as well as against the corporation itself, seeking recovery of the purchase price of
their stock. The plaintiffs also claimed that the corporation was damaged by the alleged
fraud in the purchase and sale of securities, and, on behalf of the corporation, asserted
a derivative action against the various individual defendants. Id. at 1095.
7 Since the privilege is for the benefit of the client, it is the client and not the
attorney who must object to the disclosure of the communication. 8 J. Wigmore,
Evidence § 2321, at 629 (McNaughton rev. 1961),
8 280 F. Supp. at 1019. For thorough analyses of this decision see Comment, The
Attorney-Client Privilege in Shareholders' Suits, 69 Colum. L. Rev. 309 (1969), and Note,
29 Ohio St. L.J. 1046 (1968).
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show cause why the privilege should not be invoked in the particular
instance.°
This comment initially will consider the historical basis of the
attorney-client privilege and its present application to the corporate
client. The analysis will then focus upon the soundness of the Garner
court's rationale, as well as upon that decision's likely impact on the
traditional limitations on the attorney-client privilege in the corporate
context. q
I. COMMON LAW EVOLUTION OF THE ATTORNEY-CLIENT PRIVILEGE
Although the right of the public to every man's evidence stood as
a fundamental principle at common law, 11 certain traditional excep-
tions to the rule have developed. Recognition of the attorney-client
privilege as one of these exceptions resulted from the realization of
the need for freedom of consultation between the client and his at-
torney, without apprehension of the court-compelled disclosure of the
substance of their communications." Rooted in the societal belief in
the need for confidentiality in this relationship, the attorney-client
privilege was originally recognized in order to preserve "the oath and
the honor of the attorney."" Later, the emphasis shifted to the client
and his concern for freedom from apprehension in conferring with his
attorney in regard to confidential matters. This latter policy has gained
wide judicial acceptance, and American courts now generally recog-
nize a broad application of the privilege."
In spite of this recognition, the courts are careful to protect the
attorney-client privilege against corporate abuse. In several cases the
privilege has been denied where the corporation, under the guise of the
attorney-client privilege, has "funnelled" material into the hands of its
lawyers for the purpose of avoiding disclosure." Similarly, limitations
have been placed on the group of individuals who may act on behalf
of the corporation as the client in communicating with corporate
counsel. One approach to limiting the corporate personnel who may act
in this capacity extends the benefit of the privilege only to those con-
trolling the decision-making process." Another view has advocated
extending the protection beyond those involved in the decision-making
9 430 F.2d at 1103.
10
 A choice of Iaw question was raised in Garner. The court concluded that in order
to preserve the fact-finding process in an independent judicial system, federal law must
apply, although it is incumbent upon a court in that system to respect especially strong
state policies. No such policy was found here. See Comment, 69 Colum. L. Rev. 309
(1969), for a detailed discussion of this aspect of the case.
11 8 J. Wigmore, supra note 7, § 2192, at 70.
12 Id, § 2291, at 545.
19
 Id. § 2290, at 543.
14 Id. § 2294, at 563.
15 Radiant Burners, Inc. v. American Gas Ass'n, 320 F.2d at 324.
16
 Schaefer, The Attorney-Client Privilege in the Modern Business Corporation, 20
Bus. Law, 989 (1965).
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process." Courts faced with this issue .
 have generally adopted the
"control group" approach. 18 Influenced by these limitations on the
attorney-client privilege in the corporate context, Garner would
permit the corporation's assertion of the privilege to be obviated when
the stockholders can present "good cause" as to why the communica-
tion should be •disclosed.
II. THE FOUNDATIONS OF GOOD CAUSE
The Garner court's conception of good cause is derived from an
analysis of the "particularized context' ) in which the corporation
claims the attorney-client privilege. The particularized context results
directly from the nature of the relationship between the parties in-
volved in the suit. Ordinarily, parties engaged in litigation are allowed
to assert the attorney-client privilege to avoid disclosure to their
adversaries of confidential communications made to their attorneys. A
different result, however, might be expected in a case such as Garner
when the party asserting the privilege is legally obligated to act on
behalf of those against whom the privilege is asserted. In Garner the
fiduciary obligation of corporate management to the shareholders
constitutes the particularized context which concerned the court. Since
the corporation, as a fiduciary in the corporate-shareholder context,
owes a high degree of care to its principal, it may be obligated to dis-
close information to the adversary stockholder, while against other
adversaries such information would normally be privileged. Garner
reasons that the special nature of this corporation-shareholder rela-
tionship warrants a reevaluation of the balance of interests that has
traditionally determined the availability of the privilege.
Both the commentators and the cases' have consistently recog-
nized assertion of the privilege as valid only when the harm which
disclosure would cause to the attorney-client relationship would be
greater than the benefit to be derived from placing all the facts into
evidence. Put more simply, the court must determine whether the harm
27
 Simon, The Attorney-Client Privilege as Applied to Corporations, 65 Yale L.J.
953 (1956).
18 See, e.g., City of Philadelphia v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 210 P. Supp. 483
(E.D. Pa. 1962); Garrison v. General Motors Corp., 213 F. Supp. 515 (S.D. Cal. 1963).
18 430 F.2d at 1101.
20 Wigmore lists the following conditions as essential for the attorney-client privilege
to arise -.
(1) The communications must originate in a confidence that they will not be
disclosed.
(2) This element of confidentiality must be essential to the full and satisfactory
maintenance of the relation between the parties.
(3) The relation must be one which in the opinion of the community ought to
be sedulously fostered.
(4) The injury that would inure to the relation by the disclosure of the
communications must be greater than the benefit thereby gained from correct
disposal of the litigation.
8 Wigmore, supra note 7, I 2285, at 527, and cases cited therein.	 ;
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in limiting the client's freedom from apprehension of disclosure by his
legal counsel outweighs the benefit of making the attorney's informa-
tion discoverable. Because of the particularized context in which the
case arises, Garner substitutes for the traditional test a balance of
interests test based upon the presence or absence of the elements of
good cause.
Unlike the traditional test, this new balance emphasizes the harm
to management flexibility rather than exclusively that harm which dis-
closure would have on the corporation's relationship with its attorney.
The new balance of interests also focuses upon the good cause which
the shareholder must show in order to pierce the corporation's priv-
ilege. From the stockholder's point of view, the presence or absence of
good cause depends largely upon the extent of the shareholder interests
involved in the suit, and upon the likelihood of harm to these inter-
ests.2' By measuring good cause in these terms, Garner attempts to
preclude the possibility of harassment suits by a small number of
shareholders. At the same time, by requiring the shareholders to show
some likelihood of harm to their interests as a result of actual or pro-
posed corporate action, Garner attempts to avoid impairment of the
corporate management's capacity to function effectively. As Garner
points out, the responsibility of corporate management to act in the
best interests of the corporation may at times require it to act ap-
parently adversely to some or all stockholder interests 22 The corpora-
tion's need for managerial flexibility and freedom from harassment
suits must be balanced with the shareholder interests and the likelihood
of their suffering legally cognizable harm. The necessity of balancing
these interests, Garner posits, both militates against absolute denial of
the attorney-client privilege to the corporation and suggests easing the
burden on suing shareholders to prove the benefit of disclosure as
against the injury to the corporation's managerial capacity.
Garner finds support for its limitation of the privilege among the
traditional legal axioms of corporation-shareholder relations and
among the common law exceptions to the attorney-client privilege.
Corporate law has long recognized the right of shareholders to examine
the corporation's books even though the basis for the inquiry may be to
21 In enunciating the factors necessary for consideration in its new balance of
interests test, Garner lists, in addition to the number of shareholders and the likelihood
of harm to.their interests, the necessity of their procuring the information, and whether
the claim is colorable. These additional factors will be treated subsequently, particularly
the question of the necessity of the shareholders to have corporate information. 430
F.2d at 1104.
22 Such a situation might occur where a corporation decreases dividend payments in
order to undergo capital development. Although this capital investment plan may ulti-
mately increase the shareholder's interest in the corporation, an individual stockholder
might object to the lower dividend rates. If the attorney-client privilege cannot be
invoked at all, the dissident stockholder without any showing that his claims constitute
a legally cognizable harm may be able, at discovery, to expose the proposed corporate
transaction, perhaps endangering its completion.
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commence an action." Similarly, joint interest and prospective crime
or fraud have been recognized as exceptions to the attorney-client
privilege.' Garner argues that these exceptions and rules, when con-
sidered compositely, provide a sound rationale for limiting the
availability of the privilege in the special relationship between the
stockholders and the corporation. The exceptions and rules, Garner
concludes, frame the limitations on the privilege in which the good
cause test is rooted.
Garner's conclusion, however, ignores some fundamental legal
limitations. It is submitted that the court erred in resting its rationale
on these narrow exceptions and rules, since none of them have been,
or should be, relied upon in considering the availability of the attorney-
client privilege to the corporation in shareholder suits. The grounding
of the rationale for its new balance of interests test on these rules and
exceptions required the Garner court to (1) misapply the "right to
inspect" rules, (2) embellish the joint interest exception, and (3)
avoid the troublesome, but important, evidentiary problems of the
expanding prospective crime or fraud exception.
III. THE ANALOGY TO THE RIGHT TO EXAMINE CORPORATE RECORDS
On the surface, the analogy of the shareholder's right to examine
corporate records to the shareholder's right of access to the substance
of client-attorney communications appears sound. Like the balance
between corporate and stockholder interests which Garner articulates,
the right to examine rule takes effect when the stockholder has no
other means of ascertaining the information contained in the corporate
records. Similarly, courts occasionally curtail the right to examine in
cases where the extent of the petitioning stockholder's holdings are
small compared to those of the other shareholders of the same
class."
This analogy has definite limitations, however, the most im-
portant of which is the character of the evidence in question. When the
availability of the attorney-client privilege is at issue, the court is
concerned exclusively with communications between the client and
his attorney made in the strictest confidence. 2° In contrast, when the
issue before the court is the right to examine, the shareholder seeks
evidence contained within the corporate records. Because they lack
the aspect of confidentiality, corporate records, with the exception of
confidential notes and letters to counsel, cannot assume the character
of confidential communications.
In practice, the right to examine is more like the "work product"
28 5 W. Fletcher, Private Corporations, § 2225, at 829-30 (perm. ed. rev. 1967).
24 Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure of the Judicial Conference of the
United States for United States District Courts and Magistrates, 46 F.R.D. 161 9 5.03(d)
(2) and (5) at 251.
55 5 W. Fletcher, supra note 23, § 2231, at 866.




doctrine of Hickman v. Taylor'? than the attorney-client communica-
tion concept. The work product rule involves material or information
collected or devised by the client's attorney which is privileged only
if the adversary has an alternative means of ascertaining the data it
contains.28 The attorney-client privilege, in contrast, focuses upon the
relationship of the client and his attorney, not upon the adversary's
lack of information. While the work product rule merely concerns
information, and the attorney's impressions of it," the attorney-client
privilege accords protection to a confidential relationship which the
community deems necessary and beneficial. In treating the attorney-
client privilege and the right to examine rule as analogous, Garner, in
effect, equates the work product rule and the attorney-client privilege
when, in fact, they are totally unrelated." In relying upon the right to
examine rule as a basis for permitting shareholders to defeat the cor-
poration's assertion of the attorney-client privilege, Garner mistakes
the policy considerations behind the right to examine and the privilege.
As a result, the court's effort to analogize these concepts confuses
rather than clarifies the question of shareholders' rights to corporate
communications.
IV. THE JOINT INTEREST EXCEPTION
The Garner court also cited the growth and expansion of the joint
interest exception to the attorney-client privilege as an indication of
the limitations on the availability of the privilege to the corporation.'
The joint interest exception arises, according to Wigmore, "when the
same attorney acts for two parties having a common interest, and each
party communicates with him." 82 Communications from one client to
the attorney "are not privileged in a controversy between the two
original parties, in as much as the common interest and employment
forbade concealment by either from the other." 88 Recalling its concep-
tion of the "particularized context" of corporation-shareholder rela-
tions, Garner concluded that both parties to the suit have a common
interest in the success of the corporate undertaking and that the policy
of the joint interest exception applies to the corporation-shareholder
relationship.
On the surface, the relationship between the corporation and the
shareholders and their attorney appears quite similar to the traditional
27 329 U.S. 495 (1947).
28 Id. at 511.
20 "Nor does . . . [the attorney-client] privilege concern the memoranda briefs,
communications and other writings prepared by counsel for his own use in prosecuting
his client's case; and it is equally unrelated to writings which reflect an attorney's mental
impressions, conclusions, opinions or legal theories." 329 U.S. at 508.
ao See, e.g., Radiant Burners, Inc. v. American Gas Men, 320 F.2d 314, 323 (7th
Cir. 1963).
81 430 F.2d at 1103.
82 8 3. Wigmore, supra note 7, 0 2312, at 603.
88 Id.
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business setting in which the joint interest exception arises. Under
close scrutiny, however, application of the joint interest exception to
the corporation's assertion of the attorney-client privilege fails in two
respects. First, the joint interest exception has generally been recog-
nized only in cases involving business partners who may exercise the
right of delectus personarum—the right to choose one's partners.
Second, the application of the joint interest exception in cases con-
cerning business associations in which delectus personarum is less
prominent is not analogous to the corporate context for another reason:
the corporate structure naturally precludes the opportunity for com-
munication that the parties and their attorneys must normally have in
order for the joint interest exception to arise.
Garner draws, in part, from partnership cases" in order to show
the wide acceptance of the joint interest exception. In relying upon
these cases the court largely ignored the difference in the character of
the legal relationship between the parties of joint interest in partner-
ship cases and the parties in shareholder suits against the corporation.
Because of the entirely consensual nature of the partnership form,
which results in each partner having agency status, as well as personal
liability for partnership debts, the courts have consistently observed
the right to choose one's own partner as being fundamenta1. 3' The
economic responsibility each partner undertakes results in a highly
consensual relationship of intimacy and confidence" which naturally
vests each partner with the right "to take an equal part in the trans-
action of the firm's business."" The concomitant responsibility this
right entails also naturally restricts the latitude of action each indi-
vidual has when he acts in his capacity as a partner. The corporation,
on the other hand, is treated as a separate legal entity as distinguished
from its shareholders." As a result of this separation, liability for
corporate actions cannot be assessed against the shareholders beyond
the amount of their investment. Consequently, the corporation, though
held to a fiduciary standard, has greater freedom of action than does
the partnership. Such basic differences between partnership and cor-
porate associations must affect the application of the joint interest
34
 Bil!las v. Panageotou, 193 Wash. 523, 76 P.2d 987 (1938) is cited by the court as
an example. 430 F.2d at 1103.
35 F. Mechem, Elements of the Law of Partnership, § 5, at 7 (2nd ed. 1920). The
right of a partner to consent to the selection of his fellow partners is entirely foreign to
the corporation. Individual shareholders may normally sell their shares to any purchaser
(thereby bringing such a purchaser into the corporation) without conferring with other
shareholders or, for that matter, with the corporation itself. Of course, stock transfer
restrictions are sometimes placed on shares, but in general they only give the corporation
or other shareholders an option to purchase the shares first. More stringent restrictions
than this are viewed unfavorably as unreasonable restraints on alienation of property.
See O'Neil, Restrictions on Transfer of Stock in Closely Held Corporations: Planning
and Drafting, 65 Marv. L. Rev. 773 (1952).
38 F. Mechem, supra note 35, 5, at 7.
37 Id. § 177, at 160.
38 Id.	 8, at 14; 1 W. Fletcher, supra note 23, 9 25, at 96.
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exception. In the partnership, the requisite closeness of the association
does give the parties a joint interest in making any business-related
decision, including those arrived at during communications with the
partnership's counsel." The corporation as a legal entity, conversely,
is permitted flexibility in making management decisions in spite of its
fiduciary obligation. Shareholders do not have, as the exception is
commonly applied, a joint interest with the corporation in any business
decisions, and, therefore, should not necessarily have access to cor-
poration-attorney communications.'
The joint interest exception has been validly recognized, however,
in other business associations in which delectus personarum is not
prominent. For example, the application of the joint interest exception
to the insured-insurer relationship has gained wide acceptance. The
parties involved in this relationship are in a conditional creditor-debtor
relationship'41
 much like that of the corporation and its shareholders.
In most insurance cases the question of whether the joint interest
exception applies has been raised when the insurer has its attorney
represent the insured, and the insured then brings an action against
the insurer for bad faith or negligence in settling his claims." Usually,
a crucial part of the insured's case hinges on the communications
between the insurer and its attorney, and generally, courts do not
permit the insurer to raise the attorney-client privilege since both
parties had an opportunity to communicate with the lawyer." Except
in the case of the closely held corporation, the expansive nature of the
public or quasi-public corporation practically precludes opportunities
for both parties to confer confidentially with the corporation's counsel.
Thus, the application of the joint interest exception to insurance
cases" cannot really be considered analogous to the corporate situa-
tion discussed in Garner.
Other corporate situations, however, possess the necessary con-
ditions for the application of the joint interest exception. Principally,
89 J. Crane and A. Bromberg, Law of Partnership, § 48, at 273 and § 67, at 386
(1968).
40 Of course, the shareholders and the corporation have a common interest in
making profits. However, the "joint interest" exception seems to focus more on the
character of the relationship than on its purpose; confidence and intimacy, rather than
a common goal, determine a relationship to which the joint interest exception 'applies.
41 W. Vance, Insurance, 19, at 121 (Anderson 3rd ed. 1951). The relationship is
conditional in that at the end of the insured period, the insurer will pay, in addition to
the full value of the policy, such equitable share of the surplus as may be apportioned to
such policy.
42 See, e.g., Henke v. Iowa Home Muttial Gas Co., 249 Iowa 625, 87 N.W.2d 920
(1958).
98 Id.; Car and General Ins. Corp. v. Goldstein, 179 F. Supp. 888 (S.D.N.Y. 1959),
aff'd., 277 F.2d 162 (2d Cir. 1960); Liberty Mutual Ins. Co. v. Engels, 41 Misc. 2d 49,
244 N.Y.S.2d 983 (1963); Note, 44 Iowa L. Rev. 215 (1959).
44 Garner also cites cases on joint trustors, Boyle v. Kempkin, 243 Wis. 86, 9 N.W.2d
589 (1943), and makers of mutual wills, Wilson v. Gordon, 73 S.C. 155, 53 S.E. 79
(1905), in order to demonstrate the universal application of the joint interest exception.
Neither of these situations seems analogous to the corporate-shareholder relationship.
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the recent judicial and legislative developments in the area of the close
corporation indicate that the close corporation should, in some in-
stances, be subjected to partnership, rather than corporate law, prin-
ciples. For example, some courts have imposed a fiduciary duty on
shareholders dealing with each other" much like the fiduciary duty
partners owe to each other." Commentators and cases have urged
application of partnership liability to stockholders in undercapitalized
close corporations when the shareholders appear to have taken the
corporate form merely to shield themselves from personal liability."
In addition, changes in the rules regarding the admissibility of corpo-
rate books and records in criminal prosecutions against the corpora-
tion's officers have extended ". . . to close corporations the rules appli-
cable to the admissibility of partnership books."" The application of
partnership principles to the close corporate form, especially in matters
concerning the corporation's duty to give evidence, tends to erode the
corporation's privilege to keep certain communications from its share-
holders. Furthermore, the close corporation, because of its size, does
not preclude opportunities for the shareholders to consult with the
corporation's counsel, but rather fosters such opportunities since many
close corporation shareholders serve as the corporation's officers."
Despite the apparent adaptability of the joint interest exception
to the close corporation, the exception, as delineated in the non-
corporate context, cannot be applied to the publicly held corporation.
Both the limited right of the shareholder to participate in business
decisions and the structural character of the publicly held corporation
dispel any serious argument for analogizing the joint interest exception
in other business associations to corporation-shareholder relations.
Some support for the joint interest analogy apparently emerges
from a case in the corporation-shareholder context dealing with the
accountant-client privilege. In Pattie Lea, Inc. v. District Court," a
shareholder brought an action against the corporation for an account-
ing on behalf of himself and all stockholders similarly situated. As part
of the investigation, the shareholders sought to compel the corpora-
45
 Gord v. Iowana Farms Milk Co., 245 Iowa 1, 60 N.W.2d 820 (1953); Slier v.
Sandier, 325 Mass. 348, 90 N.E.2d 536 (1950).
40 F. Mechem, supra note 35, § 170, at 152.
47 Note, Should Shareholders Be Personally Liable for the Torts of Their Corpora-
tions? 76 Yale L.J. 1190 (1967); Minton v. Cavaney, 56 Cal. 2d 576, 364 P.2d 473
(1961); Automotriz Del Golfo De California S.A. De C.V. v. Resnick, 47 Cal. 2d 792,
306 P.2d 1 (1957).
48
 See O'Neil, Developments in the Regulation of the Close Corporation, 50 Cornell
L.Q. 641, 653 (1964-65), in which Prof. O'Neil discusses Wilkes v. United States, 80 F.2d
285 (9th Cir. 1935) and Cullen v. United States, 2 F.2d 524 (9th Cir. 1924), cert. denied,
267 U.S. 593 (1925). Prof. O'Neil points out that traditionally the party bringing the
complaint has been required to show cause why corporate records should be admitted as
evidence. Partnership records, in contrast, have always been admitted without such a
showing.
49 1 F. O'Neil, Close Corporations § 1.07, at 13 (1958).
G° 161 Colo. 493, 423 P.2d 27 (1967).
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tion's accountant to testify concerning certain matters affecting the
corporation's financial condition. Even though a statute recognized
the certified public accountant-client privilege," the Colorado Supreme
Court held that the privilege did "not protect a corporation from being
required to disclose to its own stockholders in a derivative suit brought
in good faith against the corporation, communications made by the
corporation to its certified public accountant."" In light of the recog-
nition of the accountant-client privilege in several states," this case
apparently provides a sound basis for the Garner decision's joint
interest analogy. Close scrutiny of 'this decision and other federal
decisions involving the accountant-client privilege, however, reveals
Pattie Lea to be somewhat of an anomaly and perhaps inapplicable to
the situation in Garner.
The lack of identification of the alleged communications by the
court in Pattie Lea contributes in large measure to the case's un-
certainty as good precedent. The court's opinion does not indicate
which of the broad range of privileged communications covered in the
statute is in dispute. According to the provisions of the statute, the
working papers of an accountant are included as privileged commu-
nications." Since there is no description of the communications in-
volved in the opinion, it might well be argued that the court's rationale
in denying the privilege is predicated on the "work product" rule of
Hickman v. Taylor," which protects' the working papers of an attor-
ney, rather than on the traditional concept of the attorney-client privi-
lege. Further support for this contention may be found in the cases
cited in the Pattie Lea opinion. The court raised only one supporting
case," one concerned exclusively with discovery efforts to gain access to
material which the defendant's attorney had obtained from a witness.
Recent legal developments concerning the accountant-client priv-
ilege itself also undermine the applicability of the accountant-client
privilege to attorney-client problems. A persuasive factor is the federal
courts' refusal to recognize the extension of the accountant-client
privilege to work papers .held by the accountant." In Himmelfarb v.
51 The statute provided in part: "A certified public accountant shall not be examined
without consent of his client as to any communication made by his client, to him in
person or through media of books of accounts and financial records, or his advice, reports
or working papers made thereon in the course of professional employment. . . ."
(Emphasis added.) Witnesses, Colo. Rev. Stat. Ann., ch. 154 § 1-7(1) (1963).
52 423 P.2d at 29.
53 "Fifteen states and Puerto Rico have, enacted statutes conferring the status of
privileged communications upon professional information obtained by accountants.
Although there are substantial variations among these statutes, the overall trend is toward
the creation of a broad accountant-client privilege." Note, 46 N.C. L. Rev. 419, 420-22
(1968).
54 433 P.2d at 29.
55 329 U.S. 495 (1946).
56 D.I. Chadbourne, Inc. v. Superior Ct., 60 Cal. 2d 723, 388 P.2d 700 (1964).
57 Sale v. United States, 228 F.2d 682 (8th Cir.,), cert. denied, 350 U.S. 1006 (1956).
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United States," a federal court extended the limitations even further
by failing to recognize any privileged communication between an ac-
countant and his client. In contrast to the broad acceptance of the
attorney-client privilege, the accountant-client privilege has been
widely criticized" and, despite its initial acceptance, has not been
adopted in \most jurisdictions." Regardless of the basis upon which
Pattie Lea was decided, the tenuous acceptance of the accountant-
client privilege is simply not analogous. The contention in Garner that
a shareholder may pierce the attorney-client privilege asserted by the
corporation simply because shareholders in a similar situation have
been permitted to avoid the accountant-client privilege is untenable.
The effort in Garner to reconsider the attorney-client privilege
through use of the joint interest analogy directly conflicts with the
rationale of another case cited by the court. In Re Prudence Bonds
Corp.," the bondholders brought an action for an accounting against
the trust company to which they were subscribed. As in Pattie Lea, the
plaintiffs sought to compel testimony concerning certain trust company
communications, but in this case the communications were made to an
attorney. In upholding the privilege as applied to the trust company,
the court denied "that anyone, who . . . bought a bond or an interest
in a bond, thereby made the counsel for the trustee its attorney.. . .""
Garner relies on the strength of the analogies of the joint'interest
exception in other business associations as well as on the accountant-
client privilege to undercut the effect of Re Prudence." Reliance on
these analogies ignores not only the character of the relations between
the corporation and its shareholders, but also the public corporation's
structure and its natural exclusion of shareholders from the decision-
making process. Furthermore, these analogies ignore the deep roots of
the attorney-client privilege in the common law. In light of these con-
siderations, the application of the joint interest exception to the corpo-
58 175 F.2d 924 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 388 U.S. 860 (1949).
60 See generally Gellhorn, The Treatment of Confidential Information by the Federal
Trade Commission: Pretrial Practices, 36 U. Chi. L. Rev. 113 (1969). In particular,
one survey of lawyers, jurists, leading commentators and legal organizations found
strong opposition to the privilege among these segments of legal opinion. See also
Comment, The Functional Overlap Between the Lawyer and Other Professionals: Its
Implications for the Privileged Communications Doctrine, 71 Yale L.J. 1226, 1247 (1962).
60 Compare comment, 71 Yale L.J. 1226 (1962), with Note, 46 N.C. L. Rev. 419,
420-22 (1968).
61 76 F. Supp. 643 (E.D.N.Y. 1948), aff'd, 174 F.2d 288 (2d Cir. 1949).
82 Id. at 646.
68 Surprisingly, the Garner court mentions Re Prudence while offering its analysis of
the corporate client asserting the attorney-client privilege. Re Prudence has served as a
basis for the commentators who argue agairist application of the joint interest exception
to the corporation-shareholder relationship. See, e.g., Comment, supra note 8, at 317.
In recounting the case, Garner fails either to distinguish Re Prudence on its facts or to
declare it had law. In light of the arguments for not applying the joint interest exception
to the corporate client, Re Prudence, unchallenged in Garner, suggests that Pattie Lea
provides a poor analogy.
1210
GARNER V. WOLFINBARGER
ration as client should have little impact on the boundaries of the
attorney-client privilege in stockholder suits.
V. THE PROSPECTIVE CRIME OR FRAUD EXCEPTION
In addition to the joint interest exception, Garner also refers to
the prospective crime or fraud exception to the attorney-client privilege
in order to illustrate the less than absolute nature of the privilege.
This exception developed in response to the abuse of the attorney-
client privilege as a shield for a client's planning of a crime or fraudu-
lent scheme. The rationale of the exception, set forth in Queen v.
Cox," was that the attorney-client privilege should be available to the
client only when both (1) professional confidence and (2) professional
employment were present in the attorney-client relationship. The
presence of both these elements guaranteed that the extension of the
privilege to attorney-client communications would not be exploited to
defeat community interests. If the client disclosed his criminal or
fraudulent intent to his attorney, then no professional relationship
could exist between them, since the attorney could not professionally
abet illegal activity. At the same time, the failure of a client to inform
his attorney of his criminal or fraudulent intent resulted in less than
complete confidentiality in their communications."
In recent years the kinds of attorney-client communications pre-
cluded from privilege by this exception have broadened both theo-
retically and practically. Under the exception, denial of the privilege to
the corporation is no longer limited to prospective criminal or fraudu-
lent schemes. Since the decision in United States v. United Shoe
Machinery Corp.," federal courts have included any prospective
tortious conduct under the exception." Practical expansion of the ex-
ception has also occurred, particularly in the corporate area, through
the enactment of federal securities laws" and Supreme Court decisions
extending rights under these statutes to private individuals." The
extension of civil liability to once unproscribed activities of the cor-
poration broadens the scope of this exception to the privilege, bringing
diverse kinds of attorney-client discussion within the exception. The
broadening of the prospective crime or fraud exception to the attorney-
client privilege not only imposes new limitations on the availability of
the privilege to the corporation, but gives shareholders commensurately
greater access to corporate communications."
04 14 Q.B.D. 153 (1884).
65 Id. at 168.
66 89 F. Supp. 357 (D. Mass. 1950).
67
 There is some dispute as to whether the prospective crime or fraud exception has
been expanded to include tortious conduct in general. See Proposed Rules of Evidence,
supra note 24, 5 -02(d)(1), at 251.
68 For a discussion of new amendments, see Note, An Appraisal of Some Coverage
Aspects of the 1964 Securities Acts Amendments, 60 Nw. U.L. Rev. 331 (1966).
65
 See, e.g., J.I. Case Co. v. Borah, 377 U.S. 426 (1964).
71/ The consequences of this expansion of the exception arc best demonstrated in a
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In making these communications available to the suing share-
holder, the expanded exception may, however, damage the flexibility
of corporate officers to manage effectively, and, as Garner points out,
there is need for the corporation to be free from harassment suits by
disgruntled shareholders. The corporation should be able to commu-
nicate freely with its attorney in regard to legitimate matters which
cannot be made public. Gross application of the expanded prospective
crime or fraud exception enhances the risk of destruction of both
corporate flexibility and the actual availability of the privilege to the
corporation. Thus, some limitations must be imposed on the application
of the exception to attorney-client communications. Yet, assuming a
stockholder can demonstrate some basis for raising this exception to
the privilege, there is no compelling reason for denying him access to
corporate communications relating to future illegal activity which the
corporation may be contemplating. In fact, community access to such
communications is the essence of the strong policy behind the excep-
tion which denies the privilege to the client when he abuses it, regard-
less of whether the client is a corporate person. Unfortunately, Garner
neglects to discuss in depth the circumstances in which the exception
may be raised," although it generally broaches the problem of what
evidence the shareholder must show of the illegal activity in order for
the prospective crime or fraud exception to arise. The confusion in
Garner on this evidentiary point is indicative of the general inability of
courts and commentators to agree on the quantum of evidence that 72
must be proved in order to raise the exception.
The uncertainty surrounding the evidentiary problem largely re-
sults from the language of Clark v. United States." That case actually
dealt with a juror who had defrauded a court in being impanelled. In
passing on the question of a juror's privilege, 74 however, the United
case like Garner where the shareholder's complaint chargd the corporation with violations
of federal and state securities laws and fraudulent activity. The expanded securities law
gives the shareholders greater opportunity to pierce the attorney-client privilege. For
example, under the prospective crime or fraud exception if evidence is presented which
gives color to the charge that the purpose of the attorney-client consultation concerned
the client's prospective criminal or fraudulent activity, then the attorney-client com-
munications are unprivileged. Clark v. United States, 289 U.S. 1 (1933).
71 In addition to its cursory treatment of the issue of the quantum of evidence
required to raise the prospective crime or fraud exception to the attorney-client privilege,
the court avoids the crucial issue of the appropriate limitations on the expanded prospec-
tive crime or fraud (tort) exception, leaving the question of limitation for further
speculation and litigation. Although this latter problem was not at issue in Garner, it
may subsequently cause significant problems. One problem, for example, might involve
the question of whether the corporation should be reasonably aware that the subject
matter of the communication relates to an illegal purpose before the exception could arise.
72 Gardner, The Crime or Fraud Exception to the Attorney-Client Privilege, 47
A.B.A. J. 708 (1961).
la 289 U.S. 1 (1933).
74 In considering a case involving a juror's privilege, the dicta of that opinion laid
out the basic evidentiary standard for the piercing of the attorney-client privilege through
the prospective crime or fraud exception. Id.
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States Supreme Court analogized the case to the attorney-client priv-
ilege and observed that "to drive the privilege away there must be
`something to give color to the charge'; there must be prima facie
evidence that it has some foundation in fact."'" Ever since the Supreme
Court offered this dictum, courts have offered a wide range of in-
terpretations of it. The first notable decision, United States v. Bob,"
applied the prima facie standard to the fraud charged, not merely to
the establishment of a wrongful purpose during attorney-client con-
sultations. Other cases, such as Union Camp Corp. v. Lewis," also
observe the prima facie standard, but apply it only to a "showing that
the lawyer's advice was designed to serve his client in the commission
of a fraud or crime." 7° In narrowing the prima facie requirements to a
showing of illegal purpose, the Lewis opinion noted that the plaintiff
"... was not at this stage required to prove crime or fraud in order to
secure the evidence." 7° This distinction has been further refined to
require a judge to find that there is sufficient evidence to sustain a
finding that the communication was for a forbidden purpose, rather
than to actually make such a finding."
The distinctions in the quantum of evidence required to raise the
prospective crime or fraud exception apparently escaped the Garner
court, although it refers to the "obviously colorable" character of the
plaintiff's claim in listing the essentials of good cause. In a very brief
discussion, Garner includes Bob and Union Camp Corp. as standing
for the same proposition, when, in fact, they hold differently. Bob
requires a prima facie case of fraud to be made out in order for the
privilege to be pierced, while Union Camp Corp. holds that an illegal
purpose, not fraud, has to be proved for the exception to arise. From
the shareholder's point of view, the Union Camp Corp. case articulates
the soundest test. If the shareholder has the burden of actually prov-
ing the fraud or tort, as Bob presumes, the requisite evidence to pierce
the corporation's privilege could rarely be accumulated. Moreover,
under the Bob test, it seems doubtful that gaining access to the priv-
ileged communications would prove very beneficial since the stock-
holder would already have substantiated the charge of fraud without
the evidence excluded by the privilege. If, in contrast, the shareholders
were required to make out a prima facie case of illegal purpose, both
the corporation and the shareholder's interests would be advanced. The
corporation's flexibility and freedom from harassment suits would be
protected from overzealous stockholders who seek privileged informa-
tion without any real justification. Conversely, the stockholder whose
interests are genuinely imperilled would also benefit. In imposing on
7 5 Id. at 15.
70
 106 F.2d 37 (2d Cir. 1939), cert. denied, 308 U.S. 589 (1939).
77
 Union Camp Corp. v. Lewis, 385 F.2d 143 (4th Cir. 1967).
78 Id. at 144.
79 Id. at 145.
80 In re Seller, 15 N.J. 393, 105 A.2d 395 (1954); Model Code of Evidence, Rule
212 (1942).
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the shareholder the burden of presenting evidence sufficient to support
only a finding of illegal purpose, cases like Union Camp Corp. curb the
possibility of the corporation's abuse of the attorney-client privilege
to wrongfully deny its shareholders access to corporate communica-
tions.8'
Despite the Garner court's inadequate treatment of the issue, the
prospective crime or fraud exception provides the most fertile basis
for contraction of the attorney-client privilege in the corporate context.
The prospective crime or fraud exception, unlike the joint interest
exception, has natural application to the corporation-shareholder
setting since the exception clearly involves abuse of the attorney-
client privilege to infringe shareholder rights. The joint interest
exception, on the other hand, really has application only to the close
corporation unless traditional legal rules governing the corporation
and the partnership are ignored. In addition, the interests of both the
corporation and the stockholder could be better served if the standard
of proof the plaintiff must meet in order to raise the prospective crime
or fraud exception were more clearly delineated.
CONCLUSION
The continuing presence of new cases denying corporations thee
right to invoke the attorney-client privilege is prompted, in part, by
the unprecedented growth in the size and impersonality of the modern
corporation.82
 In response to the societal effort to curb the unlimited
power of corporate management, cases which hold as Garner does
have sought to increase shareholder power at the expense of corporate
confidentiality.
Perhaps the best way to preserve the rights and privileges of both
parties is to effect some balancing of interests, as did the Garner
opinion at the outset. Such a weighing of the interests, however, en-
genders problems as to appropriate limitations, especially in the sensi-
tive area of the attorney-client privilege. Like the earlier cases that
denied the privilege, Garner unfortunately fails to devise a solution
which both balances the parties' interests and observes the legal foun-
dations of the privilege.
Through the use of analogies from other areas of the law, both
inside and outside the domain of privilege, Garner posits the less than
absolute nature of the privilege in the corporate context. However, in
attempting to articulate a new standard for determining the availability
81
 Elimination of the abuse of the attorney-client privilege by the corporate client
would be enhanced by this lesser standard. Initially, the imposition of the lesser eviden-
tiary burden on the shareholders in invoking the prospective crime or fraud exception
would very likely encourage more shareholder suits. In response to such a situation, the
corporation would not only be less likely to abuse the privilege, but might also release
more corporate information in order to assuage disgruntled stockholders and to dis-
courage them from litigating disputes.
82 Radiant Burner's, Inc. v. American Gas Ass'n, 209 F. Supp. 321 (N.D. Ill. 1962).
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of the privilege, Garner erroneously lays the foundation for the
"good cause" balancing test on very narrow rules and exceptions.
One of these rules, the right of the shareholder to examine corpo-
rate records, initially appears to be a substantial reason for applying
new limitations on the attorney-client privilege in the corporate
situation. A detailed analysis of this rule indicates, however, that its
application involves considerations more akin to the "work product"
rule than to the attorney-client privilege. To graft "work product"
considerations into the attorney-client balance of interests is tanta-
mount to fundamentally altering the privilege and is, in light of the
privilege's wide acceptance and broad legal foundation, untenable.
Application of the joint interest exception to the corporate context
similarly requires a fundamental alternation of traditional legal con-
cepts. Although the joint interest exception may be adaptable to the
close corporation, the court's consideration of the exception fails to
draw appropriate distinctions between the obligation which the publicly
held corporation owes to its shareholders and that owed by the parties
to each other in other business associations. The court also neglects
to consider the structure of the modern business corporation and the
slight opportunity that this structure provides for consultation be-
tween shareholders and corporate counsel. Finally, Garner consis-
tently draws upon cases or rules, such as Pattie Lea, which do not
have a clear application to the attorney-client privilege.
Garner's discussion of the crime or fraud exception to the at-
torney-client privilege also raises some unsettled issues. Despite the
correctness of the decision in focusing its discussion on this expanding
exception to the availability of the privilege, Garner increases, rather
than eliminates, confusion over the quantum of evidence required to
pierce the privilege. Perhaps, however, Garner does make one indirect
contribution by raising the prospective crime or tort exception. That
is, the decision exposes the need for a clear delineation of the quantum
of evidence required to make the exception available.
Examined in reference to its inconsistencies and general failure
to assert a clear new standard, Garner creates more problems than it
solves. As a result, no greater limitation has been imposed on the
attorney-client privilege, nor has a firm rule of law evolved to control
this privilege in the corporate context.
ROBERT C. DAVIS
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